WEBVTT 00:00.009 --> 00:01.898 Thank you all for being here . We 00:01.898 --> 00:04.389 appreciate that . We do have votes 00:04.400 --> 00:07.150 coming as early as 30 minutes from now . 00:07.710 --> 00:09.766 So I think there are some of us here 00:09.766 --> 00:11.877 who are gonna want to ask questions . 00:11.877 --> 00:14.260 We'll have one round of questions and 00:14.270 --> 00:17.180 mine will be very brief and uh then 00:17.190 --> 00:19.357 we'll go into a classified session and 00:19.357 --> 00:21.680 see how much we can cover before votes 00:21.690 --> 00:24.219 are actually uh impending and we have 00:24.229 --> 00:26.420 to leave . So we appreciate your 00:26.430 --> 00:28.430 attendance here . I have an opening 00:28.430 --> 00:30.597 statement , but I'm going to submit it 00:30.597 --> 00:32.819 for the record for the sake of time and 00:32.819 --> 00:34.986 I'll now call on the ranking member to 00:34.986 --> 00:37.470 see what he would like to do . And I'm 00:37.479 --> 00:39.669 gonna take the the wise council of 00:39.680 --> 00:41.902 following the chairman's leadership and 00:41.902 --> 00:43.958 also submitting my statement for the 00:43.958 --> 00:46.069 record . We'd like to expedite things 00:46.069 --> 00:48.180 so that we can get the votes and then 00:48.180 --> 00:47.830 get to the classified session . Thank 00:47.840 --> 00:50.959 you . Ok , then let's go right into our 00:50.970 --> 00:53.180 uh distinguished witnesses . We have 00:53.189 --> 00:55.078 the honorable John Plum , General 00:55.078 --> 00:57.245 Anthony Cotton General Stephen Whiting 00:57.245 --> 00:59.669 and General Gry uh Gilot . If I said 00:59.680 --> 01:00.680 that correctly . 01:03.770 --> 01:06.230 Ok . I , I was way off , I'll get that 01:06.239 --> 01:07.239 before . Uh huh . 01:11.379 --> 01:15.089 Ok . Uh Guillo , uh Mr PLM , can you 01:15.099 --> 01:19.000 start , please ? Uh Yes , sir . Thank 01:19.010 --> 01:21.232 you , Chairman Lamborn and thank you uh 01:21.232 --> 01:23.430 ranking member Moulton , uh members of 01:23.440 --> 01:25.607 the committee . Uh Thanks for inviting 01:25.607 --> 01:27.496 me to testify here . I'll keep my 01:27.496 --> 01:27.400 remarks short in the interest of moving 01:27.410 --> 01:30.339 to uh questions . Uh But just very 01:30.349 --> 01:32.182 briefly , we're in a very highly 01:32.182 --> 01:34.016 dynamic and challenging security 01:34.016 --> 01:36.260 environment . We have competitors who 01:36.269 --> 01:38.325 are modernizing and diversifying and 01:38.325 --> 01:40.550 expanding their nuclear arsenals . They 01:40.559 --> 01:42.680 are also rapidly fielding space and 01:42.690 --> 01:45.519 counter space capabilities and 01:45.589 --> 01:47.422 developing and fielding advanced 01:47.422 --> 01:49.589 missiles in more uh you know , greater 01:49.589 --> 01:52.010 numbers and uh greater diversity . The 01:52.019 --> 01:54.130 president's budget request for fiscal 01:54.130 --> 01:56.241 year 25 makes critical investments in 01:56.241 --> 01:58.463 the department Strategic Forces Posture 01:58.463 --> 02:00.686 49 billion for our nuclear enterprise , 02:01.169 --> 02:03.589 uh 33.7 billion for our space 02:03.599 --> 02:06.269 capabilities and over 28 billion for 02:06.279 --> 02:08.770 missile defeat and defense and across 02:08.779 --> 02:10.612 each of these portfolios , we're 02:10.612 --> 02:12.779 investing not only in capabilities but 02:12.779 --> 02:15.001 in our network of allies and partners . 02:15.001 --> 02:17.057 Both of whom provide advantages that 02:17.057 --> 02:18.668 our adversaries or potential 02:18.668 --> 02:20.779 adversaries like Russia and China can 02:20.779 --> 02:22.612 never hope to match all of these 02:22.612 --> 02:24.446 capabilities . Nuclear space and 02:24.446 --> 02:24.240 missile defense remain central to our 02:24.250 --> 02:28.000 ability to deter uh and also central to 02:28.009 --> 02:30.120 our ability to prevail in conflict of 02:30.120 --> 02:32.176 deterrence fails . The department is 02:32.176 --> 02:34.009 committed to making the critical 02:34.009 --> 02:36.231 investments necessary to strengthen our 02:36.231 --> 02:38.287 strategic forces posture . Thanks to 02:38.287 --> 02:37.610 this committee for its tireless 02:37.619 --> 02:39.841 dedication to the department to our men 02:39.841 --> 02:42.063 and women in uniform and I look forward 02:42.063 --> 02:45.869 to answering your questions , General 02:45.880 --> 02:48.740 Cotton . Good afternoon , Chairman 02:48.750 --> 02:50.806 Lamborn , ranking member Moulton and 02:50.806 --> 02:53.139 distinguished members of this committee . 02:53.139 --> 02:55.361 It is an honor to be here today with my 02:55.361 --> 02:57.250 command , senior listed advisor , 02:57.250 --> 02:59.361 senior listed leader , Sergeant Major 02:59.361 --> 03:01.583 Kramer . And our privilege to represent 03:01.583 --> 03:03.639 the service members and civilians of 03:03.639 --> 03:05.861 the United States Strategic Command . I 03:05.861 --> 03:07.917 have submitted my posh statement for 03:07.917 --> 03:09.917 the record as a global war fighting 03:09.917 --> 03:11.861 command , Stratcom sets conditions 03:11.861 --> 03:13.694 across the globe as the ultimate 03:13.694 --> 03:15.750 guarantor of the national and allied 03:15.750 --> 03:19.550 security . Excuse me , we do 03:19.559 --> 03:21.781 this in the face of challenges . Unlike 03:21.781 --> 03:23.892 anything America has encountered . We 03:23.892 --> 03:26.220 are confronting not one but two nuclear 03:26.229 --> 03:28.396 peers , the Russian Federation and the 03:28.396 --> 03:30.380 People's Republic of China . This 03:30.389 --> 03:32.649 reality compounded by missile 03:32.660 --> 03:35.130 developments in North Korea , Iran's 03:35.139 --> 03:37.380 nuclear ambitions and the growing 03:37.389 --> 03:39.940 relationships between these nations 03:40.089 --> 03:42.250 adds new layers of complexity to our 03:42.259 --> 03:45.500 strategic calculus . While our legacy 03:45.509 --> 03:47.453 systems continue to hold potential 03:47.453 --> 03:50.440 adversaries at risk , it is absolutely 03:50.449 --> 03:53.509 critical . We continue at speed with 03:53.520 --> 03:55.770 modernization of our nuclear triad . 03:56.369 --> 03:59.369 This includes the land based ICBM S the 03:59.380 --> 04:03.070 B 21 the B 52 J , the Columbia class 04:03.080 --> 04:05.470 submarine , the nuclear sea launched 04:05.479 --> 04:07.389 cruise missile , the long range 04:07.399 --> 04:09.889 standoff weapon and numerous related 04:09.899 --> 04:13.059 systems . While also focusing on NC 04:13.070 --> 04:14.770 three enterprise upgrades and 04:14.779 --> 04:18.000 cybersecurity . The most important 04:18.010 --> 04:20.679 message I want to deliver is this while 04:20.690 --> 04:22.801 modernization will continue to be the 04:22.801 --> 04:25.239 priority us . Stratcom and its 04:25.250 --> 04:28.160 component forces are ready to deter our 04:28.170 --> 04:30.660 adversaries and respond decisively 04:30.679 --> 04:33.019 should deterrent fail . Thank you . And 04:33.029 --> 04:34.973 I look forward to your questions . 04:35.820 --> 04:38.510 Thank you , General Whiting , Chairman 04:38.519 --> 04:40.575 Lamborn and ranking member Moulton , 04:40.575 --> 04:42.630 members of the sub-committee . Thank 04:42.630 --> 04:44.741 you for this opportunity to testify . 04:44.741 --> 04:44.670 I'm pleased to be here beside Doctor 04:44.679 --> 04:46.957 Plumb , General Cotton and General Guo . 04:46.957 --> 04:49.068 And I will also abbreviate my opening 04:49.068 --> 04:51.179 statement . Our strategic competitors 04:51.179 --> 04:53.235 now hold at risk us and allied space 04:53.235 --> 04:55.457 capabilities . The People's Republic of 04:55.457 --> 04:57.279 China and Russia's actions have 04:57.290 --> 04:59.589 transformed space into a contested 04:59.600 --> 05:02.250 warfighting domain . Us space command's 05:02.260 --> 05:04.720 moral responsibility to the joint force , 05:04.730 --> 05:06.952 the nation and our allies is to provide 05:06.952 --> 05:09.063 space capabilities through all levels 05:09.063 --> 05:11.369 of competition and conflict . The US 05:11.380 --> 05:13.730 military services are sized with the 05:13.739 --> 05:16.059 assumption of always having access to 05:16.070 --> 05:18.220 space . And this is why us Space 05:18.230 --> 05:20.230 Command must protect and defend our 05:20.230 --> 05:22.341 critical space systems to ensure they 05:22.341 --> 05:24.174 are available in the face of the 05:24.174 --> 05:26.286 growing threats . Now arrayed against 05:26.286 --> 05:28.508 us . Inherent in this responsibility is 05:28.508 --> 05:30.769 our ability to protect the joint force 05:30.779 --> 05:33.549 from space enabled attack . The command 05:33.559 --> 05:35.429 seeks to expand our competitive 05:35.440 --> 05:37.662 advantage by leveraging every available 05:37.662 --> 05:40.019 asset of the interagency , joint force , 05:40.029 --> 05:42.959 our allies partners and industry yet it 05:42.970 --> 05:44.970 is vital . The command is delivered 05:44.970 --> 05:47.869 improved capability and capacity by 05:47.880 --> 05:51.070 2027 to attain an enduring advantage 05:51.079 --> 05:53.589 over any determined adversary . I am 05:53.600 --> 05:56.070 grateful for Congress's commitment to 05:56.079 --> 05:58.190 advance America's leadership in space 05:58.390 --> 06:00.557 with your continued backing us . Space 06:00.557 --> 06:02.446 command will ensure space remains 06:02.446 --> 06:04.612 sustainable , safe , stable and secure 06:04.612 --> 06:06.446 for all . I look forward to your 06:06.446 --> 06:08.334 questions . Thank you and General 06:08.334 --> 06:11.429 Guillo , Chairman Lamborn , ranking 06:11.440 --> 06:13.273 member Moulton and distinguished 06:13.273 --> 06:15.273 members of the subcomittee . It's a 06:15.273 --> 06:17.162 profound honor and to command and 06:17.162 --> 06:19.218 represent the women and men of North 06:19.218 --> 06:21.384 American Aerospace Defense Command and 06:21.384 --> 06:23.440 United States Northern Command . I'm 06:23.440 --> 06:25.273 also pleased to appear alongside 06:25.273 --> 06:27.218 General Cotton General Whiting and 06:27.218 --> 06:29.384 Doctor Plum NORAD and North com depend 06:29.384 --> 06:31.496 on robust space based capabilities to 06:31.496 --> 06:33.718 execute each of our critical missions . 06:33.718 --> 06:35.940 And the strategic deterrent remains the 06:35.940 --> 06:37.996 foundation of our homeland defense . 06:37.996 --> 06:40.218 The strong partnerships I enjoy with my 06:40.218 --> 06:42.162 fellow witnesses are crucial . The 06:42.162 --> 06:43.996 United States and Canada face an 06:43.996 --> 06:45.884 extraordinarily complex strategic 06:45.884 --> 06:47.829 environment . Our competitors have 06:47.829 --> 06:47.739 fielded advanced kinetic systems 06:47.750 --> 06:49.528 designed to strike civilian and 06:49.528 --> 06:51.361 military infrastructure in North 06:51.361 --> 06:53.306 America , both above and below the 06:53.306 --> 06:55.519 nuclear threshold . As stated in the 06:55.529 --> 06:57.307 National defense strategy , the 06:57.307 --> 06:59.473 People's Republic of China remains our 06:59.473 --> 07:01.418 pacing challenge . As the People's 07:01.418 --> 07:03.640 Liberation Army modernizes and grows at 07:03.640 --> 07:05.730 a rapid pace . The Pr CS expanding 07:05.739 --> 07:08.109 nuclear capability and capacity along 07:08.119 --> 07:09.841 with its development of modern 07:09.841 --> 07:11.786 submarines , missiles , hypersonic 07:11.786 --> 07:13.675 weapons , all present significant 07:13.675 --> 07:16.119 challenges for homeland defense while 07:16.130 --> 07:18.074 the Pr CS capabilities are growing 07:18.074 --> 07:20.074 quickly . Russia is a threat to the 07:20.074 --> 07:22.019 homeland today and is an immediate 07:22.019 --> 07:24.074 concern . Russia retains the world's 07:24.074 --> 07:26.241 largest stockpile of strategic and non 07:26.241 --> 07:28.352 strategic nuclear weapons and has the 07:28.352 --> 07:30.574 capacity to strike inside North America 07:30.574 --> 07:32.463 with air and sea launch precision 07:32.463 --> 07:34.408 conventional weapons despite heavy 07:34.408 --> 07:36.686 losses to its ground forces in Ukraine . 07:36.686 --> 07:38.852 Russia has invested heavily in systems 07:38.852 --> 07:40.852 that can threaten the United States 07:40.852 --> 07:42.630 such as advanced guided missile 07:42.630 --> 07:44.908 submarines , hypersonic glide vehicles . 07:44.908 --> 07:46.741 And ICBM S Russia also maintains 07:46.741 --> 07:48.463 significant cyber and undersea 07:48.463 --> 07:50.630 capabilities and developmental systems 07:50.630 --> 07:52.852 such as a nuclear torpedo and a nuclear 07:52.852 --> 07:55.149 powered cruise missile . Meanwhile , 07:55.160 --> 07:57.104 North Korea continues its rhetoric 07:57.104 --> 07:58.827 while testing test , launching 07:58.827 --> 08:00.660 increasingly advanced long range 08:00.660 --> 08:02.716 missiles and expanding its ties with 08:02.716 --> 08:06.140 Russia and China . While Iran currently 08:06.149 --> 08:08.205 lacks the capability to strike North 08:08.205 --> 08:10.316 America with long range missiles , it 08:10.316 --> 08:12.482 is investing in that capability . Iran 08:12.482 --> 08:14.593 also supports violent militant groups 08:14.593 --> 08:16.538 in the Middle East and maintains a 08:16.538 --> 08:18.371 worldwide network of operational 08:18.371 --> 08:20.482 surrogates with those risks firmly in 08:20.482 --> 08:22.482 mind . Nor at a North Com strive to 08:22.482 --> 08:24.427 begin homeland defense well beyond 08:24.427 --> 08:26.790 North America to do so . Both commands 08:26.799 --> 08:28.688 are working with the services and 08:28.688 --> 08:30.910 Congress to improve domain awareness in 08:30.910 --> 08:32.960 order to detect track and defeat 08:32.969 --> 08:34.747 threats ranging from long range 08:34.747 --> 08:36.750 ballistic missiles to small UAs . 08:37.859 --> 08:40.081 Finally , upon taking command , I began 08:40.081 --> 08:41.970 a 90 day assessment to inform the 08:41.970 --> 08:43.803 department , the joint force and 08:43.803 --> 08:45.692 Congress on NORAD and North Com's 08:45.692 --> 08:47.915 ability to execute a sign task and make 08:47.915 --> 08:49.970 recommendations on where the command 08:49.970 --> 08:52.789 can and should do more . Once complete . 08:52.799 --> 08:54.855 I will share my findings and updated 08:54.855 --> 08:57.077 vision for how NORAD and North Com will 08:57.077 --> 08:58.966 best execute the noble mission of 08:58.966 --> 09:00.855 homeland defense . The challenges 09:00.855 --> 09:02.910 facing our nation are real but there 09:02.910 --> 09:05.132 should be no doubt about Nora and North 09:05.132 --> 09:07.243 Com's resolve to deter aggression and 09:07.243 --> 09:07.169 if necessary defeat threats to our 09:07.179 --> 09:09.450 nations and our citizens . Again , 09:09.460 --> 09:11.682 thank you for the opportunity to appear 09:11.682 --> 09:13.738 this afternoon and I'm happy to take 09:13.738 --> 09:16.710 your questions . Thank you . Uh All of 09:16.719 --> 09:19.090 you for your opening statements . I'll 09:19.099 --> 09:21.210 reiterate what I said earlier . There 09:21.210 --> 09:23.321 will be votes called as early as four 09:23.321 --> 09:26.140 o'clock . Uh I have some questions I 09:26.150 --> 09:28.317 will submit for the record . I'm gonna 09:28.317 --> 09:30.729 ask one very brief question of Doctor 09:30.739 --> 09:33.830 Plumb and then turn it over to my 09:33.840 --> 09:37.119 ranking member and then everyone has a 09:37.130 --> 09:39.297 chance to ask questions and then if we 09:39.297 --> 09:40.963 have time , we will go into a 09:40.963 --> 09:44.229 classified session upstairs . But in no 09:44.239 --> 09:46.406 event , will we come back and have any 09:46.549 --> 09:48.940 continuation of this hearing after 09:48.950 --> 09:51.409 votes are called . Uh It'll be fairly 09:51.419 --> 09:53.530 lengthy vote series and I don't wanna 09:53.530 --> 09:55.641 keep everybody and so we will adjourn 09:55.641 --> 09:58.409 whenever votes are called with about a 09:58.419 --> 10:02.320 10 minute gap uh grace period for us to 10:02.530 --> 10:05.549 finish wrap up what we're doing and get 10:05.559 --> 10:07.559 over for the votes . Uh Doctor Plum 10:07.559 --> 10:10.309 very quickly in his 2022 nuclear 10:10.320 --> 10:12.320 posture review , the administration 10:12.320 --> 10:14.376 affirmed the continued the continued 10:14.376 --> 10:16.598 need for the triad . Has there been any 10:16.598 --> 10:19.390 changes in the policy in this regard ? 10:21.380 --> 10:23.440 No , there has not . Thank you . 10:23.450 --> 10:24.909 Ranking member Moulton . 10:27.219 --> 10:29.386 Uh Mr Chairman . Thank you very much . 10:29.386 --> 10:31.441 I'll also just ask uh one question . 10:31.441 --> 10:33.608 I'm going to direct it to Doctor Plumb 10:33.608 --> 10:33.369 and General Cotton . If either of you 10:33.380 --> 10:35.500 have comments on this . What thinking 10:35.510 --> 10:38.020 has the department done or been doing 10:38.169 --> 10:40.820 on what strategic deterrence looks like 10:41.080 --> 10:44.440 with two nuclear peers ? What does the 10:44.450 --> 10:46.506 world me , what does that world mean 10:46.506 --> 10:48.890 for our nuclear Posture , our strategy 10:49.140 --> 10:52.559 and our strategy of deterrence if it's 10:52.570 --> 10:54.570 all right . Uh Sir , I'll start and 10:54.570 --> 10:56.681 then I'll hand it to general cotton . 10:56.681 --> 10:58.848 So , uh taking very seriously , I know 10:58.848 --> 11:00.959 you and I have talked about this , uh 11:00.959 --> 11:02.903 the Strategic Posture Commission , 11:02.903 --> 11:04.959 hopefully , uh you know , bipartisan 11:04.959 --> 11:07.070 report that's come out really looking 11:07.070 --> 11:06.940 at this specific problem . And the 11:06.950 --> 11:09.117 department is using that as a bit of a 11:09.250 --> 11:11.989 uh as a as a reference guide to help us 11:12.000 --> 11:13.944 examine how to go forward . Uh the 11:13.944 --> 11:15.889 fundamental issue here , as you've 11:15.889 --> 11:18.590 pointed out is uh China's growth in 11:18.599 --> 11:20.679 their nuclear arsenal . And it's a , 11:20.859 --> 11:23.026 you know , continental level , nuclear 11:23.026 --> 11:25.081 arsenal uh changes the calculus . We 11:25.081 --> 11:27.192 don't want to be in a situation where 11:27.192 --> 11:29.415 we have to have as many nuclear weapons 11:29.415 --> 11:31.470 as Russia plus as many as China plus 11:31.470 --> 11:33.692 one more , but we do have to be able to 11:33.692 --> 11:35.803 deter both . Uh And so we are looking 11:35.803 --> 11:38.026 at that , I'd say uh roughly , we think 11:38.026 --> 11:39.803 uh you know , we continue to be 11:39.803 --> 11:42.026 sufficient . Now , program of record is 11:42.026 --> 11:41.659 OK now , but in the future , we're 11:41.669 --> 11:43.725 going to have to make adjustments uh 11:43.725 --> 11:45.836 because of this growth of China . And 11:45.836 --> 11:48.002 so we're looking at what things can we 11:48.002 --> 11:50.510 credibly do uh to help ensure the 11:50.520 --> 11:52.520 deterrence will continue to hold uh 11:52.520 --> 11:54.687 through the 20 thirties , both through 11:54.687 --> 11:56.798 our transition and in face of China's 11:56.798 --> 11:59.020 growing uh threat , Joan Cotton . Thank 11:59.030 --> 12:02.739 you . I remember Moulton . Um I'd like 12:02.750 --> 12:04.917 to add that we've been looking um from 12:04.917 --> 12:07.083 strategic command uh ever since I took 12:07.083 --> 12:10.159 command last uh 15 months ago . And , 12:10.169 --> 12:12.336 and , and what we're looking at is the 12:12.336 --> 12:14.719 strategic piece that is linked to the N 12:14.729 --> 12:17.469 pr because the N Pr allows us to look 12:17.479 --> 12:19.909 at posture and sizing . So we 12:19.919 --> 12:22.141 immediately looked at that . But as I , 12:22.141 --> 12:24.363 you know , as I mentioned to you in the 12:24.363 --> 12:26.586 office call , I think it's really about 12:26.586 --> 12:28.419 strategy as well . Um So we have 12:28.419 --> 12:30.641 actually uh commissioned a study within 12:30.641 --> 12:32.697 Stratcom uh with uh another group of 12:32.697 --> 12:35.159 bipartisan representation to really 12:35.169 --> 12:37.336 look at it from a strategic level when 12:37.336 --> 12:39.391 you have two near peers in which you 12:39.391 --> 12:42.369 have to , to , to fight . Um And how do 12:42.380 --> 12:44.760 you hold them at risk um in , in , in 12:44.770 --> 12:47.130 order to do that ? Um And as well as 12:47.140 --> 12:50.090 you know , uh the , the triad itself , 12:50.099 --> 12:52.520 um all legs of it from delivery systems 12:52.530 --> 12:54.752 to the weapons themselves are all being 12:54.752 --> 12:57.534 modernized . So just as important is 12:57.544 --> 12:59.655 what does that transition from legacy 12:59.655 --> 13:02.234 system um look like to modernize 13:02.244 --> 13:04.466 systems moving forward . Uh And we have 13:04.466 --> 13:06.835 a study that's uh well underway to , to 13:06.844 --> 13:09.525 make sure that we don't create any gaps 13:09.534 --> 13:11.534 in that transition moving forward . 13:11.534 --> 13:13.701 Well , I think that's very encouraging 13:13.701 --> 13:16.034 because the world has certainly changed . 13:16.034 --> 13:15.820 Mr Chairman . Thank you , 13:15.830 --> 13:17.997 Representative Wilson . Thank you very 13:17.997 --> 13:20.052 much , Mr Chairman and thank each of 13:20.052 --> 13:21.941 you for being here today and your 13:21.941 --> 13:24.108 service on behalf of the people of the 13:24.108 --> 13:26.274 United States , uh General Cotton . In 13:26.274 --> 13:25.539 your testimony , you state that the 13:25.549 --> 13:27.605 critical need to modernize our stock 13:27.605 --> 13:29.979 pile infrastructure and a robust 13:29.989 --> 13:31.989 science and technology base for our 13:31.989 --> 13:34.150 strategic deterrence force . I'm 13:34.159 --> 13:36.103 grateful to represent the Savannah 13:36.103 --> 13:38.049 River site where they are working 13:38.059 --> 13:40.059 around the clock to bring plutonium 13:40.059 --> 13:42.820 production facility into operation as 13:42.830 --> 13:45.280 soon as possible . They're also working 13:45.289 --> 13:47.609 to a place in 19 fifties arrows 13:47.619 --> 13:49.789 building at the Savannah River Tritium 13:49.799 --> 13:52.260 Enterprise as the only member of 13:52.270 --> 13:54.437 Congress who's ever worked at Savannah 13:54.437 --> 13:56.548 River site . I know personally of how 13:56.548 --> 13:58.869 dedicated the personnel are for the 13:58.880 --> 14:01.059 people of America . With this . We're 14:01.070 --> 14:03.126 delaying the modernization , put our 14:03.126 --> 14:06.039 security at risk . And uh we are really 14:06.049 --> 14:08.327 grateful that plutonium pit production , 14:08.327 --> 14:10.909 which is so crucial is actually uh two 14:10.919 --> 14:13.789 state salute , two site solution with 14:13.799 --> 14:16.021 Los Alamos and Savannah River . So what 14:16.021 --> 14:18.021 is the status of uh maintaining our 14:18.021 --> 14:19.021 capabilities ? 14:21.880 --> 14:24.102 Representative ? Thank you so much . Um 14:24.102 --> 14:25.880 And I've had the opportunity of 14:25.880 --> 14:27.991 actually visiting uh Sran River twice 14:27.991 --> 14:30.390 um in , in , in my uh recent job and , 14:30.400 --> 14:32.233 and in my former job , um you're 14:32.233 --> 14:34.289 absolutely right . The men and women 14:34.289 --> 14:36.067 that are , are are there are in 14:36.067 --> 14:37.789 incredible Americans and , and 14:37.789 --> 14:40.059 dedicated patriots . Um To your point , 14:40.070 --> 14:42.181 I think when we think about the , the 14:42.181 --> 14:44.348 products and components that are gonna 14:44.348 --> 14:46.348 be required from N NSA . Um III , I 14:46.348 --> 14:48.455 want to keep the throttle throttle 14:48.465 --> 14:50.835 pressed um and ensuring that we get uh 14:50.844 --> 14:53.177 pit productions and the numbers we want . 14:53.177 --> 14:55.288 I also think that we also need to pay 14:55.288 --> 14:57.455 attention to the other rare rare earth 14:57.455 --> 14:59.733 materials that are , are warranted and , 14:59.733 --> 15:01.844 and , and needed not only tritium but 15:01.844 --> 15:04.215 also lithium and , and other components 15:04.224 --> 15:06.315 that , that might be uh something 15:06.325 --> 15:08.434 that's uh that , that can , that can 15:08.445 --> 15:10.501 hold them back if you will as far as 15:10.501 --> 15:12.890 NSN NSA and their production . And then 15:12.900 --> 15:15.489 finally , um I think uh industrial base 15:15.500 --> 15:17.840 and , and , and making sure that the , 15:18.109 --> 15:20.331 the brick and mortar as you know , that 15:20.331 --> 15:22.109 the , the , the things that are 15:22.109 --> 15:24.442 actually being produced and built there , 15:24.442 --> 15:26.549 the facility itself across uh the 15:26.559 --> 15:29.679 enterprise uh for N NSA to ensure that 15:29.690 --> 15:31.857 they can accomplish all of that to get 15:31.857 --> 15:33.968 the , the buildings built in order to 15:33.968 --> 15:36.770 get the production done . And general , 15:36.780 --> 15:38.947 thank you so much . You always welcome 15:38.947 --> 15:41.169 back to Savannah Riverside any time and 15:41.169 --> 15:43.224 please let me know when you're there 15:43.224 --> 15:45.280 because I'd like to be with you . Uh 15:45.280 --> 15:45.239 Thank you for your service and 15:45.250 --> 15:47.609 Secretary Plum , you stated in your 15:47.619 --> 15:49.841 testimony that Iran continues to expand 15:49.841 --> 15:52.609 their nuclear activities . Additionally , 15:52.710 --> 15:55.059 you also state that at this time , 15:55.070 --> 15:58.479 quote , we believe Iran is not 15:58.489 --> 16:00.640 currently pursuing nuclear weapons . 16:01.119 --> 16:04.390 Secretary Plum II , I just uh that's 16:04.400 --> 16:07.000 amazing to me because um the regime in 16:07.010 --> 16:10.539 Tehran is pursuing uh uh effort 16:10.549 --> 16:13.140 of increasing their stockpile of highly 16:13.150 --> 16:15.929 enriched uranium . The regime in Tehran 16:15.989 --> 16:18.659 is continuing to develop ICBM S uh 16:18.780 --> 16:21.510 which uh can only be used uh with the 16:21.520 --> 16:23.849 intent of striking the United States . 16:24.130 --> 16:26.340 Uh And they make it clear uh as they 16:26.349 --> 16:29.140 chant death to Israel death to America . 16:29.150 --> 16:32.500 And so uh it's just um really appalling 16:32.510 --> 16:34.530 to me uh that we're in a war , we 16:34.539 --> 16:37.260 didn't choose . And that is uh a war uh 16:37.270 --> 16:39.210 with dictators with rule of gun 16:39.219 --> 16:41.441 invading democracies with rule of law . 16:41.719 --> 16:44.390 And we know that and it began February 16:44.400 --> 16:47.859 22 2022 with war criminal Putin 16:47.869 --> 16:50.659 invading Ukraine and then October 7th , 16:51.090 --> 16:54.229 the puppet Hamas of Iran invaded Israel 16:54.239 --> 16:56.549 with mass murder . Uh The dots are so 16:56.559 --> 16:58.799 easy to connect between the axis of 16:58.809 --> 17:01.989 evil . And Iran is uh we know 17:02.000 --> 17:04.790 providing drones and missiles to Putin 17:04.949 --> 17:08.369 to murder Ukrainians in return uh their 17:08.380 --> 17:10.670 collaboration . I I just can't imagine 17:10.680 --> 17:13.030 would not include nuclear and missile 17:13.040 --> 17:15.949 development . A nuclear bomb would 17:15.959 --> 17:17.903 destabilize the Middle East with a 17:17.903 --> 17:20.410 vaporization of Israel and Saudi Arabia , 17:20.420 --> 17:22.719 Egypt and our Persian Gulf allies are 17:22.729 --> 17:25.390 threatened . How close is the regime in 17:25.400 --> 17:27.270 Tehran to a nuclear weapon ? 17:30.229 --> 17:33.099 Uh uh Thank you , sir . I don't have a 17:33.109 --> 17:36.410 specific um time frame for your exact 17:36.420 --> 17:38.364 question , but I'll just say uh my 17:38.364 --> 17:41.410 testimony is based on intelligence uh 17:41.670 --> 17:43.849 assessment which is you can enrich 17:43.859 --> 17:45.869 uranium without pursuing a nuclear 17:45.880 --> 17:48.089 weapon . Obviously , you need enriched 17:48.099 --> 17:50.280 uranium to build a nuclear weapon . So 17:50.290 --> 17:52.401 I take your point as far as how close 17:52.401 --> 17:54.290 it is . I don't , perhaps General 17:54.290 --> 17:56.401 Cotton has a , has a kind of an intel 17:56.401 --> 17:58.568 informed assessment . I don't have the 17:58.568 --> 18:00.623 top of my head . My time is up . But 18:00.623 --> 18:00.089 hey , we're dealing with Iran . They 18:00.099 --> 18:03.099 have uh enough energy capability , uh , 18:03.109 --> 18:05.270 oil and gas . Uh , they don't need to 18:05.280 --> 18:08.199 have uh , a enriched uranium . Uh 18:08.209 --> 18:10.400 There's only one purpose for the for 18:10.410 --> 18:12.609 them to have enriched uranium and 18:12.619 --> 18:14.839 that's to develop a nuclear weapon to 18:14.849 --> 18:17.182 attack the United States . A yield back . 18:18.130 --> 18:20.186 Representative Carba Hall is next on 18:20.186 --> 18:23.459 the list . Thank you , Mr Chairman . Uh 18:23.550 --> 18:25.689 We all know space is essential to our 18:25.699 --> 18:27.839 everyday lives and I don't think most 18:27.849 --> 18:30.219 people understand this , not only is 18:30.229 --> 18:32.589 space critical to our national security 18:32.599 --> 18:34.839 programs , but we rely on space to 18:34.849 --> 18:37.839 check our weather , our phones to use a 18:37.869 --> 18:40.170 credit card and now , in some cases for 18:40.180 --> 18:42.239 internet connection , just to name a 18:42.250 --> 18:45.089 few , these capabilities are primarily 18:45.099 --> 18:46.880 because of our nation's robust 18:46.959 --> 18:49.709 commercial space industry . General 18:49.719 --> 18:51.459 whiting . Can you speak to the 18:51.469 --> 18:54.040 partnership between space command and 18:54.050 --> 18:56.050 commercial space companies ? How do 18:56.050 --> 18:58.050 commercial space companies help you 18:58.050 --> 19:00.300 fulfill your mission ? Congressman ? 19:00.310 --> 19:02.532 Thank you for the question . Uh I think 19:02.532 --> 19:04.366 one of our nation's uh principal 19:04.366 --> 19:06.310 advantages is our commercial space 19:06.310 --> 19:08.619 industry . Uh It is moving at 19:08.630 --> 19:11.119 incredible speed with innovation and it 19:11.130 --> 19:13.290 is outpacing commercial industry from 19:13.300 --> 19:15.589 the rest of the world . And so today , 19:15.599 --> 19:17.821 we partner with uh those companies in a 19:17.821 --> 19:19.821 number of ways . One way is through 19:19.821 --> 19:21.877 information sharing uh a cell called 19:21.877 --> 19:23.821 the commercial Integration Cell at 19:23.821 --> 19:25.543 Vandenberg Space Force Base in 19:25.543 --> 19:27.377 California . And then we also uh 19:27.377 --> 19:29.210 leverage services provided by uh 19:29.210 --> 19:31.210 commercial companies . And so we're 19:31.210 --> 19:33.377 always looking at how we can better uh 19:33.377 --> 19:35.599 both share information and leverage the 19:35.599 --> 19:37.766 capabilities that commercial brings us 19:37.766 --> 19:39.877 because we believe that makes us more 19:39.877 --> 19:41.655 effective . Thank you for those 19:41.655 --> 19:43.543 watching . Um Vandenberg is in my 19:43.543 --> 19:45.710 district General Whiting . What do you 19:45.710 --> 19:47.877 think ? Uh the biggest challenge is in 19:47.877 --> 19:50.043 space domain and how can Congress help 19:50.043 --> 19:53.119 you overcome uh this challenge ? Thank 19:53.130 --> 19:55.074 you , Congressman . Um Our biggest 19:55.074 --> 19:57.186 challenge today is the speed at which 19:57.186 --> 19:58.908 the People's Republic of China 19:58.908 --> 20:00.630 continues to develop its space 20:00.630 --> 20:02.852 capabilities . And in particular , they 20:02.852 --> 20:04.963 are developing a number of uh counter 20:04.963 --> 20:07.130 space weapon systems to hold at risk , 20:07.130 --> 20:09.297 our space systems , they're also using 20:09.297 --> 20:11.670 space to enable their terrestrial 20:11.680 --> 20:13.624 forces , their army , their navy , 20:13.624 --> 20:15.791 their Air Force , marines to make them 20:15.791 --> 20:18.013 more lethal , more precise and more far 20:18.013 --> 20:19.791 ranging . So uh I would ask the 20:19.791 --> 20:21.680 Congress's support to continue to 20:21.680 --> 20:23.736 invest uh particularly in the United 20:23.736 --> 20:25.791 States Space Force , but also in the 20:25.791 --> 20:25.719 other services that provide us 20:25.729 --> 20:27.562 capability at us Space Command . 20:27.609 --> 20:29.498 Because they have to now take our 20:29.498 --> 20:31.553 current constellations and make them 20:31.553 --> 20:34.109 more resilient . They have to develop 20:34.119 --> 20:36.397 systems that we can protect and defend . 20:36.397 --> 20:38.589 Uh those constellations . Um We need 20:38.599 --> 20:40.821 capabilities to protect the joint force 20:40.821 --> 20:42.988 from the space , enabling capabilities 20:42.988 --> 20:45.155 of others . And then we need a testing 20:45.155 --> 20:47.155 and training um uh environment that 20:47.155 --> 20:49.321 allows us to know with confidence that 20:49.321 --> 20:51.488 our space systems will work the way we 20:51.488 --> 20:53.655 need them to . And uh and that's all a 20:53.655 --> 20:53.560 lot of , that's a lot of new work and 20:53.569 --> 20:55.791 we need to make sure that we're able to 20:55.791 --> 20:57.958 do that . Thank you . A space commands 20:57.958 --> 21:00.013 and the space forces ability to move 21:00.013 --> 21:02.359 quickly has been impressive . Doctor 21:02.369 --> 21:04.660 PLM . Can you elaborate on why a 21:04.670 --> 21:07.930 mission like Vicus Knox is important ? 21:07.939 --> 21:10.161 And why do you think we've seen success 21:10.430 --> 21:12.486 when moving quickly when it comes to 21:12.486 --> 21:15.109 space ? Whether it's uh it be 21:15.119 --> 21:18.680 technically uh responsive space or uh 21:18.689 --> 21:21.119 Space Development Agency Proliferation 21:21.130 --> 21:24.680 Satellite Architecture . Uh Thank you , 21:24.689 --> 21:26.800 Congressman uh for the questions here 21:26.800 --> 21:28.967 on Vicus Knox , which is a technically 21:28.967 --> 21:31.022 responsive launch . I'm a big fan of 21:31.022 --> 21:33.078 this concept of being able to launch 21:33.078 --> 21:35.339 quickly uh in particular , in the way 21:35.349 --> 21:37.127 it was done there , which is in 21:37.127 --> 21:39.239 response to uh you know , a simulated 21:39.250 --> 21:41.709 threat . So I think the idea of what 21:41.719 --> 21:43.830 you use technically responsive launch 21:43.830 --> 21:45.941 for uh the original thought was maybe 21:45.941 --> 21:48.310 use it for reconstitution uh which may 21:48.319 --> 21:50.263 have a play here . But I really do 21:50.263 --> 21:52.597 think the idea of there's something new , 21:52.597 --> 21:54.708 we wanna go look at it . How fast can 21:54.708 --> 21:56.763 we stack a rocket , get a payload on 21:56.763 --> 21:59.630 there to go inspect a thing or uh uh is 21:59.640 --> 22:01.862 a really interesting question and I , I 22:01.862 --> 22:03.918 think the services really knocked it 22:03.918 --> 22:06.140 out of the park on that particular , on 22:06.140 --> 22:08.029 that particular mission . Uh Your 22:08.029 --> 22:10.029 second question uh was about moving 22:10.029 --> 22:12.140 faster , I think in space development 22:12.140 --> 22:14.362 agency . Uh And as general Whiting just 22:14.362 --> 22:16.251 said , you know , partnering with 22:16.251 --> 22:17.973 commercial uh space , which is 22:17.973 --> 22:20.029 currently an economic engine for the 22:20.029 --> 22:22.196 United States , which we should all be 22:22.196 --> 22:24.196 proud of . Uh One of the things the 22:24.196 --> 22:23.770 business community to do is actually 22:23.780 --> 22:25.780 innovate at speed so they can close 22:25.780 --> 22:28.002 their business case and we're trying to 22:28.002 --> 22:27.920 figure out how to harness that . And I 22:27.930 --> 22:30.097 think what Derek Turner is doing at SD 22:30.097 --> 22:31.986 A is really impressive , which is 22:31.986 --> 22:34.041 trying to get the government to move 22:34.041 --> 22:36.152 faster and trying to build on best of 22:36.152 --> 22:38.319 current available and do replenishment 22:38.319 --> 22:40.319 with uh increasing uh technological 22:40.319 --> 22:39.969 upgrade . As we go , it's a really 22:39.979 --> 22:42.349 impressive uh thing he's doing . And I 22:42.359 --> 22:44.526 think we need to continue to encourage 22:44.526 --> 22:46.748 it . And as I've said in this committee 22:46.748 --> 22:48.915 before , that also means we would need 22:48.915 --> 22:51.137 uh congressional help to make sure that 22:51.137 --> 22:50.829 if something fails or not every single 22:50.839 --> 22:53.061 satellite works that we don't shut down 22:53.061 --> 22:55.228 that effort that's actually built into 22:55.228 --> 22:57.561 the way we want to design going forward . 22:57.561 --> 22:59.728 Thank you . I won't have time for your 22:59.728 --> 22:59.510 response . But I wanna put this 22:59.520 --> 23:01.579 question in the record , responsible 23:01.589 --> 23:03.645 behavior in space is critical to the 23:03.645 --> 23:05.756 productive use of this domain now and 23:05.756 --> 23:08.089 for future generations , Doctor Plumber , 23:08.089 --> 23:09.978 how does the department encourage 23:09.978 --> 23:11.890 responsible behavior or detour 23:11.900 --> 23:14.699 dangerous behavior in this domain ? You 23:14.709 --> 23:16.765 don't have to answer it . I'm out of 23:16.765 --> 23:19.300 time , Mr Chair , you back . Just send 23:19.310 --> 23:20.866 me the answer . Thank you , 23:20.866 --> 23:22.977 Representative Stefani . Thank you so 23:22.977 --> 23:24.977 much , Chairman General Guillo , as 23:24.977 --> 23:27.032 ballistic missile threats from North 23:27.032 --> 23:29.254 Korea and Iran continue to advance . Do 23:29.254 --> 23:30.866 you believe that it would be 23:30.866 --> 23:33.088 strategically worthwhile to construct a 23:33.088 --> 23:35.254 third homeland missile defense site at 23:35.254 --> 23:37.310 the Dod and Congress's chosen East 23:37.319 --> 23:39.597 Coast location at Fort Drum , New York , 23:40.760 --> 23:42.982 congresswoman , I'm aware that uh there 23:42.982 --> 23:45.149 was a recent assessment that said that 23:45.149 --> 23:47.829 uh such a site was not an operational 23:47.839 --> 23:50.061 necessity . However , as an operational 23:50.061 --> 23:52.283 commander that watches very closely the 23:52.283 --> 23:55.520 advances that our adversaries are 23:55.530 --> 23:58.810 making uh primarily Iran and uh even 23:58.819 --> 24:01.390 more so North Korea . Uh I think that 24:01.400 --> 24:03.949 it's uh important for me as the 24:03.959 --> 24:05.910 commander to have uh continually 24:05.920 --> 24:08.089 assessed the threat and see if there 24:08.099 --> 24:09.766 are any changes in the threat 24:09.766 --> 24:11.877 environment that would necessitate uh 24:11.877 --> 24:14.140 additional capabilities to defect the 24:14.150 --> 24:16.372 to affect the homeland . And so I would 24:16.739 --> 24:19.380 sorry General in the in my office when 24:19.390 --> 24:21.390 you were kind enough to visit , you 24:21.390 --> 24:23.112 said it would be strategically 24:23.112 --> 24:24.946 worthwhile and you supported the 24:24.946 --> 24:24.579 construction . I understand the 24:24.589 --> 24:27.109 assessment process . But um as , as you 24:27.119 --> 24:29.380 and I spoke in my office , you said 24:29.390 --> 24:31.334 this would be strate strategically 24:31.334 --> 24:33.279 worthwhile , particularly as we're 24:33.279 --> 24:35.501 considering threats , not threats , not 24:35.501 --> 24:37.557 just of today , but of the future as 24:37.557 --> 24:39.779 well . Uh , yes , Congressman , if , if 24:39.779 --> 24:41.779 the assessment came back that those 24:41.779 --> 24:41.489 threats , I thought it would be 24:41.500 --> 24:44.810 worthwhile to , um , uh , to , to build 24:44.819 --> 24:47.709 that site , a site , what would an 24:47.719 --> 24:49.750 operational requirement for a third 24:49.760 --> 24:52.093 homeland missile defense site look like , 24:54.329 --> 24:56.551 uh , congresswoman that would depend on 24:56.551 --> 24:58.329 the threat . But I think , uh , 24:58.329 --> 25:00.329 dispersal away from the , the sites 25:00.329 --> 25:02.551 that we have now . So we don't have all 25:02.551 --> 25:04.773 of our proverbial eggs in , in , in one 25:04.773 --> 25:06.940 basket would be very important and the 25:06.940 --> 25:09.107 other would be to make sure that it is 25:09.107 --> 25:09.089 located uh somewhere in the continental 25:09.099 --> 25:12.170 United States where it would , um , 25:12.180 --> 25:15.589 have the kinematic responsiveness to uh 25:15.599 --> 25:17.766 intercept threats that are coming from 25:17.766 --> 25:19.932 a different avenue and Fort Drum meets 25:19.932 --> 25:22.043 those requirements . Well , I would , 25:22.043 --> 25:24.266 uh , that's the dod s position , that's 25:24.270 --> 25:26.492 Congress's position that Fort Drum is , 25:26.492 --> 25:28.492 in fact the location of a potential 25:28.492 --> 25:30.714 East Coast missile defense that you are 25:30.714 --> 25:32.770 aware of that . I am aware of that . 25:32.770 --> 25:32.079 Yes , ma'am . And it meets those 25:32.089 --> 25:34.880 requirements . Well , it , it , it does 25:35.099 --> 25:37.119 what I'm , uh , I , I think I'm 25:37.130 --> 25:39.297 answering a different question is with 25:39.297 --> 25:41.630 future uh capabilities that we may have . 25:41.630 --> 25:43.797 I think we would have to assess that . 25:43.797 --> 25:47.229 Uh But based on the , the previous , 25:47.239 --> 25:49.406 yes , I know that that Fort Drum was , 25:49.406 --> 25:51.572 was the primary location . Great . And 25:51.572 --> 25:53.795 you understand , if , and when Congress 25:53.795 --> 25:56.017 establishes a requirement for the , for 25:56.017 --> 25:58.128 a third homeland missile defense site 25:58.128 --> 26:00.350 on the east coast . You understand that 26:00.350 --> 26:02.183 it's the dod s responsibility to 26:02.183 --> 26:04.295 execute that requirement . I would be 26:04.295 --> 26:06.461 the strongest advocate to execute that 26:06.461 --> 26:08.572 uh requirement if the , if the threat 26:08.572 --> 26:10.628 required it . Yes , ma'am . And then 26:10.628 --> 26:12.906 shifting gears here , upstate New York . 26:12.906 --> 26:15.072 In addition to being home to Fort Drum 26:15.072 --> 26:17.128 in my district , we also are home to 26:17.128 --> 26:19.295 another key Arctic unit . Uh , the New 26:19.295 --> 26:21.910 York Air National Guard 109th Airlift 26:21.920 --> 26:23.819 Wing and the 1 0/9 Airlift Wing 26:23.829 --> 26:27.030 operates the LC 130 Hs or known as the 26:27.040 --> 26:29.300 ski birds . These planes as you know , 26:29.310 --> 26:31.532 are the only platform in the world that 26:31.532 --> 26:33.754 can provide critical logistical support 26:33.754 --> 26:35.977 in and around the Arctic . Yet they are 26:35.977 --> 26:38.032 at the very end of their operational 26:38.032 --> 26:40.254 capability . Do you believe that the LC 26:40.254 --> 26:42.254 one thirties have enabled the US to 26:42.254 --> 26:44.421 maintain a strategic presence and lead 26:44.421 --> 26:46.699 in the Arctic . Uh Congresswoman ? Yes , 26:46.699 --> 26:48.810 without a doubt . In fact , just this 26:48.810 --> 26:51.000 past week , they were in Raor up uh at 26:51.010 --> 26:53.619 uh Arctic edge and , and uh ice camp 26:53.630 --> 26:55.670 operation of performing that unique 26:55.680 --> 26:58.339 capability we believe . And this is a 26:58.349 --> 27:00.571 bipartisan issue for members of the New 27:00.571 --> 27:02.571 York delegation . I just authored a 27:02.571 --> 27:04.793 letter with my colleague , Paul Tanco . 27:04.793 --> 27:06.960 So bipartisan support about the urgent 27:06.960 --> 27:09.127 need for their recapitalization . So I 27:09.127 --> 27:11.182 would refer you to that . We'll make 27:11.182 --> 27:13.293 sure your office has a copy of that , 27:13.293 --> 27:15.405 but that's very important to maintain 27:15.405 --> 27:17.405 our leadership strategically in the 27:17.405 --> 27:19.682 Arctic region . Yield back . Thank you , 27:19.682 --> 27:21.793 Representative Norcross . Thank you , 27:21.793 --> 27:25.699 Chairman um General Cotton . 27:26.040 --> 27:29.849 Uh We recently heard that the 27:29.859 --> 27:32.780 Sentinel program or heard it triggered 27:32.790 --> 27:35.380 the Nun mccurdy Act indicating there 27:35.390 --> 27:38.939 were serious concerns of cost overrun 27:39.250 --> 27:42.229 and getting less to the actual dollars 27:42.239 --> 27:45.310 and cents and time delay . Um 27:46.229 --> 27:48.709 We're about to uh approve , hopefully 27:48.719 --> 27:51.170 approve a budget and some money that's 27:51.180 --> 27:53.180 going to go into the fund , the 27:53.189 --> 27:55.969 Department of Defense . Uh and we are 27:55.979 --> 27:58.920 facing increasing pressures to fund all 27:58.930 --> 28:02.199 our programs . Uh We have had the three 28:02.209 --> 28:04.709 legs of the triad , incredibly 28:04.719 --> 28:08.660 important if 28:08.670 --> 28:11.930 the Sentinel program continues and 28:12.689 --> 28:15.400 in the projections where it is going , 28:16.359 --> 28:18.303 it could come to the point that it 28:18.303 --> 28:21.489 almost becomes unaffordable in the way 28:21.500 --> 28:24.719 that it's laid out at . What point do 28:24.729 --> 28:28.390 we look at that program and say , do we 28:28.400 --> 28:30.599 go back to the drawing board ? Not so 28:30.609 --> 28:33.780 much to recapitalize our existing 28:33.790 --> 28:36.339 Minuteman threes , but the requirements 28:36.750 --> 28:38.939 look at a different way of that third 28:38.949 --> 28:41.229 leg of the triad . Can you comment on 28:41.239 --> 28:44.689 that ? Representative Norcross ? Thanks 28:44.699 --> 28:48.550 for the question we have . So , um 28:48.560 --> 28:50.699 you know , in , in , in regards to 28:51.859 --> 28:54.369 three administrations uh doing an 28:54.380 --> 28:56.689 assessment in regards of , do we keep a 28:56.699 --> 28:58.421 triad or do we go to something 28:58.421 --> 29:01.890 different ? Um all said , uh we must 29:01.900 --> 29:04.229 maintain a triad . Um And I'm not 29:04.239 --> 29:06.350 suggesting that but within one of the 29:06.350 --> 29:08.461 legs , do we look at it differently ? 29:08.461 --> 29:10.628 Not just replicate and update with the 29:10.628 --> 29:12.850 existing ones , but look at a different 29:12.850 --> 29:14.850 configuration . Well , I don't know 29:14.850 --> 29:17.183 about a , a different configuration and , 29:17.183 --> 29:19.350 and , and , and I guess , I don't know 29:19.350 --> 29:21.572 what you , what you probably not a good 29:21.572 --> 29:23.739 idea in an open session , but the idea 29:23.739 --> 29:27.589 of just modernizing what we have to 29:27.599 --> 29:30.069 make it more acceptable to obviously 29:30.170 --> 29:32.699 father time . But I can't answer from 29:32.709 --> 29:35.339 this perspective . Um , Congressman as 29:35.349 --> 29:37.750 far as the requirements that , that we 29:37.760 --> 29:39.260 lay and that's , that's my 29:39.260 --> 29:41.479 responsibility is stratcom . Um And 29:41.489 --> 29:43.545 then the provider of that capability 29:43.545 --> 29:45.656 has come back to say that we can no , 29:45.656 --> 29:47.822 we can only meet that requirement at a 29:47.822 --> 29:49.878 certain amount of time in which that 29:49.878 --> 29:51.878 that needs to then be replaced by a 29:51.878 --> 29:53.878 more modernized system . So if that 29:53.878 --> 29:55.822 answers your question and that's , 29:55.822 --> 29:57.711 that's when I think we still must 29:57.711 --> 29:59.767 maintain an ICBM leg of some of some 29:59.767 --> 30:01.933 semblance that probably looks a little 30:01.933 --> 30:04.045 different than a Minuteman three . So 30:04.045 --> 30:07.729 the cost factor , there's no price that 30:07.739 --> 30:09.850 we can put on it , we'll pay whatever 30:09.850 --> 30:12.150 it takes to get it in . Well , I I 30:12.160 --> 30:14.271 would hope , you know that , that the 30:14.271 --> 30:16.438 Air Force and everyone will be able to 30:16.438 --> 30:18.604 take a look at that and , and , and be 30:18.604 --> 30:20.438 able to come come , come to some 30:20.438 --> 30:22.660 conclusion on how you can , how you can 30:22.660 --> 30:24.771 make that . But the requirement for , 30:24.771 --> 30:26.993 for the land based ICBM has not changed 30:26.993 --> 30:29.216 from , from my perspective . There's no 30:29.216 --> 30:31.438 question about that . So Doctor Plumb , 30:31.438 --> 30:33.660 this is I throw it in Pure Lane . Is it 30:33.660 --> 30:36.420 time that we look at that leg of how it 30:36.430 --> 30:39.459 is currently required and what we might 30:39.469 --> 30:42.319 do differently to bring in those cost 30:42.329 --> 30:45.229 issues . I'm not suggesting we do away 30:45.239 --> 30:46.961 with it , but do we look at it 30:46.961 --> 30:48.906 differently ? So we all have to be 30:48.906 --> 30:51.128 careful here because we're now in a non 30:51.128 --> 30:53.350 mccurdy breach situation , sir . But my 30:53.350 --> 30:53.089 understanding is that one of the 30:53.099 --> 30:55.266 requirements for the Congress and this 30:55.266 --> 30:57.155 is uh under Secretary Lap Plant's 30:57.155 --> 30:59.321 purview in a NS specifically and , and 30:59.321 --> 31:01.979 not ours , uh , is to rook the 31:01.989 --> 31:04.211 requirement and look at other ways that 31:04.211 --> 31:06.100 could be possible to do it as all 31:06.100 --> 31:08.045 requirement of the NMB through the 31:08.045 --> 31:10.267 Congress statute . All right , then let 31:10.267 --> 31:12.433 me switch things over to an easy one . 31:12.433 --> 31:16.209 Let , let's talk about um , the 31:16.219 --> 31:18.989 electromagnetic spectrum , something 31:19.000 --> 31:20.729 easy and non-controversial 31:22.689 --> 31:26.560 up . Obviously , this is rears its 31:26.569 --> 31:30.140 ugly head quite often . Uh We recently 31:30.150 --> 31:32.550 went through , uh , what the Department 31:32.560 --> 31:35.750 defense uh , wants to keep versus what 31:35.760 --> 31:38.310 the cellular carriers would like to 31:38.319 --> 31:42.140 obtain . Uh , it's not going to get 31:42.150 --> 31:45.020 any better soon . What is your 31:45.030 --> 31:47.520 assessment ? Not of where we just came 31:47.530 --> 31:49.641 from , but where we're going to be in 31:49.641 --> 31:51.752 five years with technology , not only 31:51.752 --> 31:54.510 from what the cellular carriers might 31:54.520 --> 31:58.359 need for our private side , but what we 31:58.369 --> 32:00.839 might need as a spectrum and then 32:00.849 --> 32:03.319 whether it's 3.45 gigahertz , I mean , 32:03.329 --> 32:05.385 it keeps expanding in different ways 32:05.385 --> 32:07.607 that we can get into the spectrum . Can 32:07.607 --> 32:09.718 you give us an assessment of where we 32:09.718 --> 32:11.900 are with that five minutes or less ? 32:11.910 --> 32:14.077 Yes , sir . So I actually just had the 32:14.077 --> 32:16.132 pleasure of getting down to uh Eglin 32:16.132 --> 32:18.243 Air Force Base and seeing some of our 32:18.243 --> 32:20.466 electronic warfare squadrons in the air 32:20.466 --> 32:22.521 Force . Uh And uh I'll just say , uh 32:22.579 --> 32:24.900 the value of spectrum to the war fight 32:24.910 --> 32:26.910 and the ability to operate in these 32:26.910 --> 32:28.743 bands that we have carved out of 32:28.743 --> 32:30.521 ourselves is only gonna grow in 32:30.521 --> 32:32.688 importance . And in particular , as we 32:32.688 --> 32:34.799 focus uh on China's are facing threat 32:34.799 --> 32:36.966 where they have been aware of this for 32:36.966 --> 32:39.132 a long time . We have to maintain what 32:39.132 --> 32:42.140 we have to be able to compete . Uh ew 32:42.359 --> 32:45.109 in the Ukraine Russia conflict is 32:45.119 --> 32:47.341 providing lessons for everyone is being 32:47.341 --> 32:49.452 used every single day . Uh We have to 32:49.452 --> 32:51.675 be ready for that . We have to be ready 32:51.675 --> 32:53.675 to fight our , you know , near pure 32:53.675 --> 32:55.841 adversaries , not places where we just 32:55.841 --> 32:57.952 have superiority . My apologies , I , 32:57.952 --> 32:57.849 you back . Thank you , Representative 32:57.859 --> 32:59.915 Bacon . Thank you uh Mr Chairman and 32:59.915 --> 33:01.970 thank you gentlemen for being here . 33:01.970 --> 33:04.081 It's been a treat for me to work with 33:04.081 --> 33:06.137 many of you on the uh on the DAO out 33:06.137 --> 33:08.359 here . Uh got to talk to John Guo about 33:08.359 --> 33:10.581 a week ago . So threw some questions at 33:10.581 --> 33:12.748 you then . So I'm gonna focus a little 33:12.748 --> 33:15.026 more on the stratcom and space uh side . 33:15.026 --> 33:17.081 First of all , it's very , I believe 33:17.081 --> 33:19.415 it's imperative that we have 400 ICBM S , 33:19.415 --> 33:21.637 we , we can't extend it any longer . Uh 33:21.637 --> 33:21.520 So it's one imperative that the Air 33:21.530 --> 33:23.800 Force get this right and I learn from 33:23.810 --> 33:25.979 the mistakes and , and , and get these 33:25.989 --> 33:28.079 400 missiles uh installed . Uh This 33:28.089 --> 33:31.069 committee is committed overwhelmingly 33:31.079 --> 33:33.135 to have three legs to try out and do 33:33.135 --> 33:35.246 the modernization . The one area that 33:35.246 --> 33:37.357 we sometimes think thinks doesn't get 33:37.357 --> 33:39.190 the attention it deserves is the 33:39.190 --> 33:41.246 nuclear command and control . And in 33:41.246 --> 33:43.301 particular , from my vantage point , 33:43.301 --> 33:45.523 the survivability , a part of that . So 33:45.523 --> 33:45.270 Joe Cotton , can you share with us the 33:45.280 --> 33:47.790 current status of stratcom SNC three 33:47.800 --> 33:50.400 modernization efforts and your road map . 33:52.199 --> 33:54.143 Congressman Bacon . Thanks for the 33:54.143 --> 33:56.310 question . I'm actually quite proud of 33:56.310 --> 33:58.421 what the team has done in the last 15 33:58.421 --> 34:00.255 months in regards to um create a 34:00.255 --> 34:03.959 roadmap for NC three . I think when I 34:03.969 --> 34:06.025 talked to this committee last year , 34:06.025 --> 34:08.191 one of my go dos was to ensure that we 34:08.191 --> 34:10.413 could articulate the , the requirements 34:10.413 --> 34:13.449 from a near term midterm and long term 34:13.459 --> 34:15.709 perspective . Um We were able to do 34:15.719 --> 34:18.219 that . Um It actually culminated with a 34:18.290 --> 34:21.949 uh deputy uh the , the DS D Department , 34:21.959 --> 34:24.389 Deputy Secretary of Defense uh meeting 34:24.600 --> 34:27.649 um with turned into yet a go do for uh 34:27.659 --> 34:30.870 for the service components on what we 34:30.879 --> 34:32.935 need to fight tonight , what we need 34:32.935 --> 34:34.823 for the midterm um activities and 34:34.823 --> 34:37.046 modernization of NC three and then what 34:37.046 --> 34:39.570 will it take for the , the out years Um 34:39.580 --> 34:41.949 We're in the middle of a trade study 34:41.959 --> 34:44.719 right now , uh to find the , the best 34:44.729 --> 34:47.649 fit for it to be frank the midterm , um 34:47.659 --> 34:49.600 0 to 5 year because we're already 34:49.610 --> 34:51.840 funded . And thank you um for being 34:51.850 --> 34:53.906 able to fund us for getting the near 34:53.906 --> 34:56.183 term and fight tonight activities done . 34:56.183 --> 35:00.030 Um So as we prosecute that road map , 35:00.040 --> 35:02.750 um it'll , it'll be able to show us uh 35:02.760 --> 35:05.320 gaps and seams um that could 35:05.330 --> 35:09.000 potentially be seen between 05 and five 35:09.010 --> 35:11.177 and 10 moving forward . So we're quite 35:11.177 --> 35:13.177 proud of the work that's being done 35:13.177 --> 35:15.066 there . Thank you . Uh One of the 35:15.066 --> 35:18.060 survival aspects for the nuclear C 35:18.070 --> 35:20.399 three is the E six B Mercury mission uh 35:20.419 --> 35:22.252 where we have a airborne command 35:22.252 --> 35:24.475 command post , we put a flag officer on 35:24.475 --> 35:26.697 board that can take over of Stratham as 35:26.697 --> 35:28.863 set the White House and the Pentagon . 35:28.863 --> 35:30.641 So as you know , the E six B is 35:30.641 --> 35:32.419 approaching retirement and this 35:32.419 --> 35:34.530 timeline may accelerate once the Navy 35:34.530 --> 35:36.363 has confidence that it's program 35:36.363 --> 35:38.419 scheduled to transition to the T AMO 35:38.419 --> 35:40.800 mission to the C 130 J . So , are you 35:40.810 --> 35:42.754 confident that the Air Force has a 35:42.754 --> 35:44.810 solution or a program to replace the 35:44.810 --> 35:46.754 airborne command posts and looking 35:46.754 --> 35:48.977 glass missions which today fly on the E 35:48.977 --> 35:50.977 SIX B . So part of that trade space 35:50.977 --> 35:53.032 study actually looks at that because 35:53.032 --> 35:55.088 that is a gap . Um And the , and the 35:55.088 --> 35:57.143 requirement is that the E six B will 35:57.143 --> 35:59.760 fly through the 2036 time frame . So as 35:59.770 --> 36:02.939 you have mentioned , um the T AO um um 36:02.949 --> 36:05.270 acquiring um acquisition is already 36:05.280 --> 36:07.558 underway in the Department of the Navy . 36:07.558 --> 36:10.610 Um So as that trade space study comes 36:10.620 --> 36:13.270 to closure , it will identify that gap . 36:13.280 --> 36:15.447 And at that point in time , we'll need 36:15.447 --> 36:17.613 to find um you know , what is going to 36:17.613 --> 36:19.889 be the replacement for the back end of 36:19.899 --> 36:22.121 that airplane . As you mentioned , it's 36:22.121 --> 36:24.288 imperative that we have this mission . 36:24.288 --> 36:26.455 It , it gives second launch capability 36:26.455 --> 36:28.566 for our is IM Force . So this is very 36:28.566 --> 36:30.621 important Mr Chairman that we follow 36:30.621 --> 36:32.732 with the Air Force on this because we 36:32.732 --> 36:32.550 gotta have this mission . We don't have 36:32.560 --> 36:34.838 a plan for it yet and we're gonna have , 36:34.838 --> 36:36.893 we're gonna have to work this work , 36:36.893 --> 36:39.116 this part hard uh general lighting up . 36:39.116 --> 36:41.227 When I came in the Congress , I tried 36:41.227 --> 36:40.260 to put a lot of attention on the 36:40.270 --> 36:42.214 electronic Magne magnetic spectrum 36:42.214 --> 36:44.969 operations as an old guy called just ew . 36:45.280 --> 36:47.391 Um but we , we feel like we had a lot 36:47.391 --> 36:49.613 of work to do there and I know Stratcom 36:49.613 --> 36:51.724 has picked up the , the leadership on 36:51.724 --> 36:53.947 it . But I know you were telling me how 36:53.947 --> 36:56.113 important ew is to the space mission . 36:56.113 --> 36:55.959 So could you talk a little bit about 36:55.969 --> 36:59.219 your role in the EW realm ? Thank you 36:59.229 --> 37:01.451 for the question . Congressman . Uh You 37:01.451 --> 37:03.673 know , our satellites on orbit the only 37:03.673 --> 37:05.896 way they can get their information down 37:05.896 --> 37:07.896 to planet earth . Is through the EW 37:07.896 --> 37:10.062 spectrum . So it's absolutely vital to 37:10.062 --> 37:12.118 all that we do and we appreciate the 37:12.118 --> 37:14.340 leadership role that uh uh the Congress 37:14.340 --> 37:16.507 has taken . And , and now , uh by , by 37:16.507 --> 37:18.451 uh us stratcom having the military 37:18.451 --> 37:20.673 responsibility for that , we have stood 37:20.673 --> 37:22.673 up a , uh an em , joint , em office 37:22.673 --> 37:24.860 inside of uh us Space Command that is 37:24.870 --> 37:27.037 already very busy and it's , it's only 37:27.037 --> 37:29.037 about seven months old . Uh that is 37:29.037 --> 37:32.340 making sure as we see um uh em I in the 37:32.350 --> 37:34.628 environment jamming in the environment , 37:34.628 --> 37:36.794 how are we assessing that ? How are we 37:36.794 --> 37:38.961 operating through that ? And um it's , 37:38.961 --> 37:41.072 it's just foundational to all that we 37:41.072 --> 37:43.239 do . Congressman . Thank you very much 37:43.239 --> 37:45.350 and I'll put a question in the record 37:45.350 --> 37:45.070 asking about the importance of the 37:45.080 --> 37:48.030 future roles for the B 52 and why , why 37:48.040 --> 37:50.318 it's so vital to the strategic mission ? 37:50.318 --> 37:52.484 But I'm out of time so I'll , I'll put 37:52.484 --> 37:54.651 it in for the record . Thank you . Are 37:54.651 --> 37:56.484 you ? Thank you , Representative 37:56.484 --> 37:59.129 Garamendi . Uh Thank you , Mr Chairman 38:01.570 --> 38:05.110 uh Mr Plumb . You spoke in response to 38:05.120 --> 38:08.560 uh Mr Norcross about the uh none 38:08.590 --> 38:12.179 mccurdy requirement . Uh You went 38:12.189 --> 38:14.189 through it very quickly . There are 38:14.189 --> 38:17.439 five specific elements of the law that 38:17.449 --> 38:20.620 must be answered . Are you in the Air 38:20.629 --> 38:24.030 Force prepared to answer all five fully , 38:24.270 --> 38:26.350 completely and honestly , 38:29.129 --> 38:31.929 uh congressman . So just to be clear , 38:31.939 --> 38:34.161 I don't have any none mccurdy statutory 38:34.161 --> 38:36.106 Authority myself . That is an A NS 38:36.106 --> 38:37.995 thing , but Yes , of course , the 38:37.995 --> 38:40.217 department will be answering them fully 38:40.217 --> 38:42.217 and honestly and correctly , John M 38:42.217 --> 38:43.606 Cotton . Same question . 38:46.199 --> 38:47.580 Uh The answer is yes . 38:50.250 --> 38:52.510 Very good . I think that takes care of 38:52.520 --> 38:56.189 it . Um Well , I expect that and we 38:56.199 --> 38:59.000 would expect nothing less here . Uh If 38:59.010 --> 39:01.219 we were to define strategy in the 39:01.229 --> 39:03.979 military terms , we would probably say 39:03.989 --> 39:07.070 it's uh aligning unlimited 39:07.080 --> 39:09.479 aspirations with limited amount of 39:09.489 --> 39:12.939 money . Unless somebody has found some 39:12.949 --> 39:15.919 way to continue to increase by perhaps 39:15.929 --> 39:19.300 10% or 15% a year . They Department of 39:19.310 --> 39:22.330 Defense budget strategy means making 39:22.340 --> 39:25.810 choices by the military as well as by 39:25.820 --> 39:28.719 us . General Cotton . You spoke earlier 39:28.860 --> 39:32.500 about the need for the ICBM . Uh 39:32.510 --> 39:36.219 You said it's a re it's required . Can 39:36.229 --> 39:38.379 you tell me in specificity 39:40.139 --> 39:42.060 what can not , what can 39:44.070 --> 39:47.840 not be done by the other two legs of 39:47.850 --> 39:51.790 the triad that only the ICBM can do 39:54.310 --> 39:57.090 Congressman Garamendi . I can the ICBM 39:57.100 --> 39:58.649 provides a responsive . 40:01.780 --> 40:05.500 The ICBM provides a , a responsiveness 40:05.530 --> 40:07.641 to the president of the United States 40:07.641 --> 40:09.697 that no other two legs can provide . 40:09.697 --> 40:11.939 Really . That is correct . The , the 40:11.949 --> 40:15.530 bomber force and the submarine force is 40:15.540 --> 40:17.699 not responsive . They are responsive 40:17.709 --> 40:20.820 but not as responsive and quickly . Um 40:20.830 --> 40:23.679 um can it provide a response as quick 40:23.689 --> 40:26.219 as the ICBM if it was warranted by the 40:26.229 --> 40:28.118 president ? If I was to present , 40:28.118 --> 40:31.419 present , what would create a response ? 40:31.959 --> 40:34.292 Well , I I would rather not talk . Well , 40:34.292 --> 40:36.620 let's know there's a warning coming 40:36.629 --> 40:39.379 from uh Mr General whitting 40:40.500 --> 40:42.679 that they're incoming missiles . 40:44.899 --> 40:47.629 What's the response to it ? Well , it 40:47.639 --> 40:49.750 would , it would be obvious obviously 40:49.750 --> 40:51.639 up to the President of the United 40:51.639 --> 40:53.750 States on , does he want to ? And how 40:53.750 --> 40:55.917 many minutes does he have to receive ? 40:55.917 --> 40:58.028 I will not say that here in open , in 40:58.028 --> 41:00.195 an open hearing in the public domain . 41:00.195 --> 41:03.699 It's 15 minutes . You don't need to 41:03.709 --> 41:06.080 respond . But , um , I don't know 41:06.090 --> 41:08.312 anybody is going to be disagreeing with 41:08.312 --> 41:10.479 that . Is that the nation of , is that 41:10.479 --> 41:13.459 the definition of responsive 15 minutes 41:13.469 --> 41:15.636 to make a decision about the launch of 41:15.636 --> 41:17.858 those weapons ? Now , let's assume they 41:17.858 --> 41:20.219 were launched . Would it make any 41:20.229 --> 41:24.129 difference if it was 15 minutes or 41:25.139 --> 41:27.770 30 40 minutes at a ? Well , you're 41:27.780 --> 41:30.439 making the assumption uh Congressman 41:30.449 --> 41:32.770 that the , that the difference between 41:32.780 --> 41:35.489 the other two legs is yet another 15 or 41:35.500 --> 41:38.139 20 minutes and I can get in more detail 41:38.149 --> 41:40.260 if we were in a closed environment to 41:40.260 --> 41:42.260 tell you what that difference would 41:42.260 --> 41:44.260 really be . They're , they are less 41:44.260 --> 41:46.580 responsive , survivable leg is the sea 41:46.590 --> 41:49.260 leg , flexible leg is the air leg . 41:49.479 --> 41:51.810 Responsive leg is the icy b , in other 41:51.820 --> 41:54.770 words , immediate launch or lose it . 41:56.199 --> 41:58.310 It's the user to lose it , isn't it ? 41:58.389 --> 42:00.389 That's , it's not the effect of the 42:00.389 --> 42:02.500 launch . The launch would be the same 42:02.500 --> 42:04.722 if it were launched from a submarine or 42:04.722 --> 42:07.330 from an airplane . Uh That's not quite 42:07.340 --> 42:09.562 correct . Uh uh Congresswoman because I 42:09.562 --> 42:11.340 can hold , I can hold different 42:11.340 --> 42:13.396 elements at risk with the , with the 42:13.396 --> 42:15.618 different different legs of the triad . 42:19.169 --> 42:21.113 We should go into that in detail . 42:21.879 --> 42:23.768 General wedding . What is your uh 42:26.159 --> 42:29.870 um need for programs that are 42:29.879 --> 42:33.729 not in your current budget ? About 42:33.739 --> 42:36.389 $1.3 billion ? Uh Congressman , I I 42:36.399 --> 42:38.719 just uh have signed our unfunded 42:38.729 --> 42:41.169 priority list and that total is about 42:41.179 --> 42:43.699 $1.2 billion . Could you use any part 42:43.709 --> 42:45.850 of the $6 billion ? It's currently 42:45.860 --> 42:48.649 authorized for the continued progress 42:48.659 --> 42:50.770 of the Sentinel even though it is now 42:50.770 --> 42:53.229 none mccurdy . Would you like about 42:53.239 --> 42:57.179 maybe 1/5 of that , about $6 billion 42:57.189 --> 42:59.356 we're gonna spend on the Sentinel this 42:59.356 --> 43:01.729 year Congressman . I don't identify the 43:01.739 --> 43:03.919 sources of the funds just I know what 43:03.929 --> 43:06.151 my requirements are to fulfill my point 43:06.151 --> 43:07.985 here is to my colleagues . We do 43:07.989 --> 43:10.669 identify the source and we do have the 43:10.679 --> 43:13.030 responsibility of aligning strategy 43:13.340 --> 43:17.159 with limited money . Thank 43:17.169 --> 43:20.080 you . Are you look back ? OK . That 43:20.090 --> 43:22.429 concludes the questioning portion of 43:22.439 --> 43:25.820 our hearing today . Uh Let me just add 43:25.830 --> 43:27.552 a slight clarification from my 43:27.552 --> 43:29.719 perspective . You threw out a number a 43:29.719 --> 43:31.941 minute ago . Representative Garamendi , 43:31.941 --> 43:33.997 there are different numbers that are 43:33.997 --> 43:36.108 floating around out there and I don't 43:36.108 --> 43:38.330 think it would be wise for any of us to 43:38.330 --> 43:40.330 confirm or deny any specific number 43:40.330 --> 43:42.608 because I think that that's really not , 43:42.608 --> 43:44.774 not a topic of discussion we should be 43:44.774 --> 43:46.886 having in an open session like this , 43:47.159 --> 43:49.215 which leads me to my next point , we 43:49.215 --> 43:51.381 will um go into recess and immediately 43:51.381 --> 43:55.189 reconvene upstairs and have perhaps a 43:55.199 --> 43:58.080 brief classified hearing because votes 43:58.090 --> 44:00.429 will be called shortly . But uh we will 44:00.439 --> 44:02.661 have a classified hearing for those who 44:02.661 --> 44:04.717 are able to attend and thank you for 44:04.717 --> 44:06.409 your testimony today . We are in recess .