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Global Strike Symposium

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Maj. Gen. Alston: Good morning, everybody. Thank you very much, I appreciate the opportunity to be a part of the inaugural Technology and Innovation Symposium.

I also want to thank General Klotz. I'm sure that when he turned to his staff and he said hey, you know what, why don't we do Global Strike Challenge like 11 months after we started taking forces? And the pressure he put on the staff and the pressure he put on the number air forces and the wings to make this happen. But coming from my last job on the Air Staff, one of the most important things, one of the important muscle movements that we made was to establish and make an Air Force commitment to stand up a new major command. And one of the principle reasons we did that was to unify this fantastic mission under single leadership and to start having absolutely common standards and common accountability, and to begin to force and help nurture a common culture, and I don't think you get a better leg up on that than having Global Strike Challenge right now, and all these other activities feeding on that. I'm sure that was challenging for everybody, but you're pulling it off with a smile and it's a great event, and I appreciate that.

I think it's fantastic that we have had the chance to see the leadership of the past. The legacy, the shoulders, the giants whose shoulders we have been standing on trying to get this job done. And to see them in the flesh and to hear their views and to see them and I'm sure in a lot of cases shake their hand and have conversations with them, it's inspiring for me to watch and be a part of.

I'll also tell you I'm inspired by the warriors and the spirit. We are writing the strategic deterrence check on your back every day and you are cashing it magnificently, and I'm proud to be a part of this team. You're doing a fantastic job. Thank you very much.

So I'm pretty fired up. I do perform well with passion. It's just who I am. It's my modus operandi. So I'll try to refrain myself and not go over the edge too much here, but I'm pretty excited about the job I have, the responsibility that I share with the men and women of 20^{th} Air Force.

I'd like to take you on a little bit of a journey. Before I do, I have to alibi. Yesterday General Carpenter comes in and he

brings a movie. Now my thought -- I mean I could have brought a movie. [Laughter]. I didn't bring a movie. But I'm thinking, hey, I know General Carpenter, he's bringing the movie so that he can like reduce his exposure for talking. [Laughter]. So I said oh, brilliant. Trade off your real responsibility to talk and show a movie. And then he didn't stop talking so he didn't get any questions. They took the mike away from him. [Laughter]. So then I say brilliant, brilliant. [Laughter]. No, I think by the time I finish we'll still have a chance to ask questions. I welcome those questions, so fire away. Take your chance, take your shot, and I'll do my best to answer.

Now I need to have a private conversation with the company grade officers so the rest of you just indulge me for a second. I'm going to make three points today. So I have three main points. It's not just going to be company grade, junior enlisted as well. I'll make three points. I'm going to tell you what the points are. There is a quiz later on -- whether or not we have a quiz here in public or whether or not I just track you and hunt you down, you will be accountable for the answers in the long run.

The first point that I'm going to make, and I'll try and be very clear with these points so that you can write slowly if you want. But we're going to talk about the relevance of strategic deterrence, the relevance of the triad, and the ICBM. I know that sounded like three points, but that is only the first point, so I don't want to confuse you.

The second point, I'm going to talk about Air Force stewardship, Air Force Global Strike Command stewardship of the ICBM mission.

Then the third point I'm going to make, I'm just going to talk about what's on my mind. What concerns me today, what my focus is and why I'm looking at the things I'm looking at.

The first point is the relevance of the ICBM, the strategic deterrence mission.

As you all know, over the last 18 months we have had an extraordinarily public debate on nuclear weapons. It's been in the context of reduction, it's been in the context of the Nuclear Posture Review, we negotiated a treaty, they established a bipartisan commission led by Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger. There has been extraordinary detailed examination of the nation's nuclear programs. And I would like to just review a few things here. I think these are fairly good quotes that I'll work

through here. Because that kind of examination, that kind of a look, that kind of a frank debate was necessary for so many different reasons, and the outcome has been printed, established, and now we have a treaty that is important to our constitution on the advice and consent of the Senate, and that's working its process. We have a Nuclear Posture Review that gives us direction as well. And so the examination is over and we are where we are right now. So a pretty deep examination and here are some of the points I'd like to stress out of that.

Out of the Perry/Schlesinger, one of the comments they made was, "So long as nuclear dangers remain we must have a strong deterrent that is effective in meeting our security needs and those of our allies."

Another quote, this one from the Nuclear Posture Review. "The triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems should be maintained." That was debated, examined hard.

The NPR also said, and this is a little bit of a paraphrase, the United States will de-MIRV to one warhead in the ICBM force, and that will enhance stability.

You may or may not be aware there was a Defense Science Board review, General (Ret) Larry Welch, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Very active, most well respected gentleman and leader. He has well documented his assessment of the Defense Science Board assessment. And as the Russians and the United States would draw down the number of nuclear weapons, the value of the ICBM to stability increases as you get to these smaller numbers. So if we deMIRV and you have 400, 450 ICBMs and the Russians reduce in a comparable way, then you still provide such a volume of targets that they have to essentially exhaust their force and it just makes them draw the conclusion that the former Soviet Union would have drawn for all the Cold War, which is ultimately, not today. So deterrence prevailed and we prevailed. But that stability enhancing characteristic of the ICBM is just a point to remember.

The ICBM will concentrate even more value to first strike stability. In the course of the Nuclear Posture Review discussions and examination that went on for roughly nine months or so, there was a community that would talk about preserving the ability to retaliate, which is an emphasis on the SSBN force. And we were very much advocates for a strong triad as we would sit around the table and discuss these issues.

But I'm less of a retaliation guy and I'm more of a first strike deterrent guy. I'm certainly aligned with the mission that is the first strike deterrent, but I believe in that and I believe that the ICBM force sitting there exposed as it is, sitting there in plain view, has a special stabilizing characteristic just because you have to fully commit to your hostile intent through the ICBM field in order to achieve your objective. So that kind of a threat that we pose to those who would look and see is substantial. And the threat that the ICBM force, that America's ICBM force poses, because of its credibility, is a major contributor to those who would do us harm, who would draw the conclusion, as they have since 1945 -not today.

Another quote from the NPR. Bear with me, this is a little bit longer but there's some good stuff in here. "ICBMs provide significant advantages to the U.S. nuclear force posture including extremely secure command and control, high readiness rates, and relatively low operating costs. The Department of Defense will continue the Minuteman III life extension program with the aim of keeping the fleet in service to 2030 as mandated by Congress. Although a decision on any follow-on ICBM is not needed for several years, studies to inform that decision are needed now. Accordingly, the Department of Defense will begin initial study of alternatives in fiscal years 2011 and 2012."

Another quote from the NPR, "Maintain the current alert posture of U.S. strategic forces." This was debated much. U.S. nuclear capable heavy bombers off full alert, nearly all ICBMs on alert, and a significant number of SSBNs at sea at any given time.

So after all of this scrutiny, what does this tell you? I think what this tells us is that some of you in the back row will be sitting in the front row in years to come with your open collar and your blue blazer with little brass buttons on it, handing out trophies. So I think that you need to think long term here. And one of you will probably be giving the ICBM pitch. I think you can count on it. So kind of exhaustive study, get back to work, and encourage your kids to become missileers. [Laughter]. They've got a great career in front of them, great career opportunities in front of them. That's point one.

The second thing I want to talk about is stewardship. The Air Force has I think about \$4.4 billion in the FYDP in support of the Air Force nuclear enterprise. That's fairly substantial. We have done a great job with the Minuteman III ICBM itself over

the last ten years. It is a great story. I don't know how effectively we tell that story, but it's a great story. We virtually rebuilt the entire rocket from one end to the other. It's a fantastic program. And the simultaneous deployment of so many disparate systems had a lot of system risk associated with that. Our partnership with industry and the support of Congress and the Air Force, I mean we did it. It's a fantastic story.

Now a system like any other system it is, and we have worked to do in the launch control center. We have other infrastructure issues that we're going to work through. But man, I mean this Exhibit A of stewardship and commitment, that \$7 billion stands front and center so it's pretty good.

What else is going on right now though? We've done a variety of security upgrades already. I'm going to try to talk about the programs that are still in play. One of them is our fast rising V-Plug, or our Turbo V-Plug. This security enhancement just enables us to quickly button up the launch facility if we felt there was a risk that would drive us to that. So instead of coming up over an extended period of time, the thing comes up pretty darn quick, get out of the way. That is well underway and we have a couple of hundred of those done, but we're in the middle of that program. It's good.

We've put remote cameras at all the launch facilities. We're still wiring some of those at one of the wings, but this is a fantastic security enhancement. And the ability to see every one of our launch facilities all the time is a fantastic capability. We can see it from the base and we can see it from each one of our missile alert facilities in the field. So I know they're another great security enhancement.

We've also been expanding a concept called the Tactical Response Force. This isn't a lot of money. It is a substantial manpower commitment, but it isn't a lot of money. And these are young men and women that are trained, additionally, in special tactics, techniques and procedures, to secure nuclear weapons. It's a great capability that we've got, but it's a work in progress. We integrate this with air power and missile complex in a pretty sophisticated way.

The integration of air power, even with the venerable Huey, is a fantastic story over the last ten years in the ICBM complex.

I was an ops group commander at the end of the '90s and I left for 15 months to go be a vice wing commander some place, then came back into the ICBM business just 15 months later.

Major General Tim McMann was the Commander of 20th Air Force at the time, but the transformation and the integration of air power to secure the ICBM field was fantastic in such a short amount of time. That is rich with opportunity for further development. We barely scratched the surface on how to effectively integrate that.

And as we finish the selection process, the deployment of a helicopter that would replace the Huey, man, we're going to have just fantastic capability. So everything's on track with that.

Then we're doing things like taking care of environmental control systems at all the launch facilities and all the missile alert facilities. We're replacing our World War II era submarine power plants that were our diesel engines with contemporary diesel engines. I know it sounds like why is that interesting? I think it's pretty cool, actually, that we're finally getting off the dime on that, but that's a program well underway and good things are happening with that. So you've got to take care of those kinds of fundamental infrastructure issues.

There is still some work being done on the ICBM itself. We have three stages in the Minuteman III, but above that, is a propellant system rocket engine. That requires life extension, so we're getting on with that right now as well, and that program's underway, so another good story.

Yesterday General Chambers mentioned our transport erectors. These are the vehicles that we move the rocket body to and from the base, and it has a hoist in the top of it so that when you erect it, that's how you lower the Minuteman III into the launch facility, and we have, there are parts of that truck that aren't necessarily 40 years old, but I think the hoist is not one of those parts. We've got that in work right now, but we've got to find more joy faster with that, in my view, so a lot of work to be done with that yet. But really important, obviously. Because we do and emplace missiles from time to time.

Then we have other trailers that we move our nuclear weapons around the complex and other critical gear. And we do have a program that's on board that is going to replace those vehicles, and that's vital to refreshing the technology and the capability in the field.

But one of the things that I'm kind of discovering in my 120 days in the job so far is that the flash to bang of the investments that we're making in nuclear and when it reaches our troops in the field, there's considerable delay. So we can save

\$4.4 billion, but if you go talk to a lieutenant or you talk to a young airman and you say what do you think? They'll say man, everybody's talking good about reinvigoration and continuing to strengthen and I believe it, I see it in my leadership. I've got a spring in my step. I'm working it hard. Okay, what do you see? How has your life changed? A lot. Well, I expected a lot, and there are a few other things that happened. But there are some improvements that they have identified that I need to close on faster to get that kind of capability in their hands, and they aren't necessarily large ticket items. But in the large program, you know, we get there when we get there. I think that we've got to highlight these things, bring them out, and help the MAJCOM drive towards closure on a few of these things to further not only show our commitment, but to get some good capability into the field with some relatively small investments that are really important to us. Those programs are underway as well, but I'm worried about it all being top down and not enough bottom up driven, and I think we can do a little bit more bottom up work there. So we will.

That was point two, going through some of the stewardship items. I'm going to nurturing that we're doing in the weapon system and the infrastructure.

The third thing I want to talk about are my concerns. The things that I'm focused on right now.

The first thing I'll talk about and I'll probably spend most of my time if I don't cut my own self out, is human capital. The expression is a little bit not so accessible. What do we mean by that?

I will tell you that as I left my last job on the Air Staff as the A10, we've been working that for quite some time. I left very unsatisfied because it's a very complicated challenge that we have, especially when you're looking across the Air Force nuclear enterprise, to try to see how you can change 332,000 personnel management policies in order to service some of the very pressing needs we have in one discreet part of our Air Force. Although we all got the memo and it may be a discreet part of our Air Force, but it was revalidated on the 4th of July to [Chief Nembles], this is the number one priority we've got working. So I expect a little bit of movement here.

I find the ones that I'm missing, that I saw what we were trying to do from Washington and now I've come to the field and the Chief of Staff didn't exactly say hey Don, you packed your chute now go jump it, but he kind of said that. So now I am on

this end trying to recognize or find how do I enable the larger Air Force system to bring us joy in 20th Air Force with human capital development. I think that where we are getting our house in order and doing a better job is in defining what our requirements are for all of our nuclear authorizations in the field.

Right now the personnel system probably gets full credit if they send a person with little or no nuclear experience into one of our billets. Because if we don't say we need nuclear experience, who am I to hold them accountable? We've got to clean up our own books first. So General Chambers talked about these key nuclear billets. That's good. That's a slice. That's about 1100. I've got 9600 folks in 20th Air Force, and General Carpenter has more than that in 8th Air Force, so between the two of us is most of the nuclear enterprise and that's just 1100 billets. So the key nuclear billets have their role, and I value them, but I need it deeper than that. I really am on the verge of becoming the personnel officer in 20th Air Force. I think I kind of informally am. But I need to ensure that we are spelling this out much more clearly so that we can then leverage current personnel policies to improve the way we're doing business. But we have a lot of work to do there.

We incentivize migration out of the nuclear business into the space business for the missile officers, and those incentives continue to exist, and I'm not about changing those incentives but we need to create incentives inside the nuclear program to make sure that we are retaining the folks that we need to retain and we continue to nurture them and have a good career development plan to support them. I think there's still a lot of work to be done with that. I'll be glad to talk more about that because I've got some very definitive views about how we ought to be doing human capital development.

One of the good things that's going on right now too is that the Weapons Instructor Course out at Nellis established an ICBM Weapons Infrastructure Course. The first class graduates in December, and I'll head out to the graduation ceremony for folks. And the first assignments for all of them will be each one of the ICBM wings plus 20th Air Force. And these folks are going to bring something different to our wings that I don't think exists today with enough density. When you think that we had 9 ICBM wings and 26 bomber wings, and now we have 3 ICBM wings and 3 bomber wings, with that smaller force structure, I can speak for 20th Air Force, I believe we very effectively train people what to do and how to do it. But I think we're light on training them why they do it. The guys that are going to come out of Nellis in

this first class, I've been down and talked to them, I've seen the curriculum, we have just punished them for six months with getting into the books in depth and to see how current flows, and to see just great granularity why the weapon system operates the way it does. I'm expecting them to propagate a base and move that level of data frankly not just across the ops group, but can they stimulate that kind of deep dive beyond that. I believe we have uneven experience in 20th Air Force, and with that we distribute risk. Sometimes we take senior NCOs that otherwise we might have put in a special place to help us manage the movement of maintenance in the missile complex, and we've chosen in some cases to move some of those guys to the field, which is great and noble, but it doesn't mean that I can uncover the requirement back on the base.

So how do you accelerate experience? There are those that would say you cannot accelerate experience. Well, that's an interesting debate, but I'm in charge of 20th right now. I don't have time to like wait, so what's my intervention? One of the interventions is to think about how can we get additional depth into our training programs? Because if we can help guys answer that why, I think they will be a force multiplier for us. So we're working that. I've got a few ideas on how we can pull that off.

The other thing is, there's an awful lot of oversight of the Air Force nuclear enterprise, of all nuclear programs. It's unlike any other business that we have in the Air Force. I mean one nuclear weapon probably has 2,000 guys of oversight. So where do they come from? They come from our six wings. Principally they come from our six wings. Yes, they can come from the labs and they can come from the Nuclear Weapons Center, but the mass is in our six wings. And what do they feed? They feed more to Global Strike Command a few jobs and STRATCOM. They feed the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Air Force Safety Center, the Air Force Inspection Agency, the Joint Staff, Department of Energy. That's a lot of places that we push our people who otherwise have been lost patrols or unaccounted for. So we need to capture all of those requirements and make sure that all of the evolving personnel policies that are going to help us get a tight human capital development plan, that we're going to be able to recognize all of our feeder requirements and support the mission in the field and make all that stuff come together. I don't think that's rocket science, but we're not there yet. So more to follow.

One other point that I'd make is we have the unique capability, nuclear weapons, and we typically don't measure the

efficacy -- I think General Carpenter used that word yesterday, too, so both your numbered air force commanders using efficacy in a sentence. But the efficacy of nuclear weapons doesn't lend itself well to the algorithms in our Pentagon on how we value systems, because the way we value systems is typically on military utility. What is the blast radius of this bomb? How many can you pack on a jet? It is a set of criteria that lend themselves well to everything but may not lend themselves well to nuclear capabilities.

So when you have a whole system that is requirements generation and everything that puts value on these other things that are more objective and more focused on military utility, then it requires special advocacy by folks who are very well schooled in what our business is and what we do in order to cover the gap to ensure that we can move forward. And to be sure, in the advocacy of nuclei requirements, there's a whole special infrastructure back there that contributes to that advocacy. There's Nuclear Weapons Council that's legislated. There are other little pockets of excellence that contribute to covering this and bridging this, but it is a phenomenon that a lot of us in uniform that are not part of the inner circle of nuclear capabilities, it doesn't translate that easily into other brothers and sisters in arms who aren't exactly part of our business but are part of our programming and resourcing business.

Those are my three points. I'm going to summarize a couple of things then we'll take some questions.

Strategic deterrence is a function of a couple of things. It's certainly a function of clear communications. And interestingly, to me, the past few weeks we have had a major STRATCOM exercise, Global Thunder. And in that exercise you can't see ICBMs maneuver so well, but you certainly can see our bomber force maneuver very well. And I don't mean to say something that will be impolitic, but I will. Last night at score posting I got -- I'm in danger here. But the 509th guys, and I love them and I couldn't have greater respect for them, and they apparently have some cops that really shoot well. [Laughter]. But nothing speaks louder than the radar crosssection of a B-52 in a major exercise or any other time. And that's that clear communication, this conditioning that we have over generations, this conditioning that we have created between potential adversaries and the United States. We know how to communicate with each other, we know how to demonstrate to each other. And with a bomber force of all types of airframes and skills, that is a visible component, it is one that provides for escalation control in a very overt kind of way, and we must

practice those things, and we do practice those things. So you've got all this muscle in motion during Global Thunder.

You have high publicity on Global Strike Challenge. We are transmitting on every channel right now. We are transmitting that we are here and we are ready, and don't think for a second that people that are very interested in our systems aren't watching, because they are watching. This is pretty inspiring to me.

Strategic deterrence is also a function of really hard work. Extraordinary. Today in 20th Air Force we have 419 out of 421 ICBMs on alert. Do the math. 99.5 percent today. That is a testament to the maintainability, sustainability, reliability of this exquisite weapon system, the Minuteman III, and it is also directly related to the personal endeavor of 1100 people right now in a missile complex or directly in support of a base with real estate the size of Pennsylvania. It's hard work. We do it every day. We have always done it every day. And this work and this commitment absolutely defines who we are in 20th Air Force.

Thanks a lot. What questions do you have for me?

[Applause].

Question: You mentioned something about developing personnel more and providing incentives for reenlistment and staying in so we can retain the experience that you can only really gain from time in the career field and getting your hands on the equipment and figuring out the intricacies that don't actually come from just studying tech data. I was wondering if you could expound upon that please, sir.

Maj. Gen. Alston: Well I've got some more mature views with the crew force, but here's how I feel about the security forces and the maintainers and the ops group all at once.

I think that in the near term there would be benefit to examining how I can pump more why into your training. And it seems to me that you have lesson plans that at some point say at this point notify the crew. I think that we could then team across the groups to expand that so that the ops group would then write and expand and say okay, this is why you're calling me now. These are the things that I'm doing for you at this time. And then, and it works the same way across all of the groups so that I can have some intervention to try to accelerate your experience. So I'm focused a lot on how I can get you more depth of understanding of the work that you're doing. Things beyond

just studying the tech data and beyond being exposed to lesson plans. I'm absolutely depending on your leadership and your first line supervisors to be able to provide that additional feel, but we don't have the same depth of experience in 20th Air Force as we did in the past. We don't have the same amount of nuclear savvy that we would have had, and the same density of nuclear savvy. So we have people being assigned at senior ranks in some of the wings who don't have any nuclear experience. How does this happen?

So I went down to the personnel center and I said is it true you assigned these kinds of ranks to these nuclear wings without any nuclear experience? They say yes. Then I should have turned to the colonels that were at the table and said then you get full credit for that.

So there is, you also have to think about how do I keep you in the community. Of course in the ICBM business a lot of it is homesteading at three wings. Some guys love it. Some guys can't wait to get out of it. What can I do to normalize that in a way that everybody gets a good productive experience?

I used to think that homesteading was inherently evil. It certainly has limitations. I like to get new blood or we get too tribal, even across our three wings. Then I became a wing commander. There's only a couple of places to do missile maintenance, and I love certain guys. Like that example that General Chase said, looking for those two NCOs yesterday. He knew what dependency he had on them for mission success.

So I don't think there's a simple solution to the assignment piece of this, but I think it's something that's worth looking at, and to find a way to make sure that we're looking at the incentives and disincentives and see if we can strike a balance that would improve that. I'll also tell you that I need your help to figure this out. Give me the idea. I'm in the global. Let me see what I can do.

I know that was unsatisfying, but we need to get more energy focused on this.

Question: To pull a little bit more on the discussion of building expertise in the nuclear enterprise, in industry we hear a little bit more discussion nowadays about knowledge transfer. Maybe that's a term that's not globally heard, but we hear a lot about it. Even starting to find that [inaudible] contract discussions. Can you share with us, assuming that's starting to define the transfer of some of the experience based knowledge

form industry into the military ranks, what your expectations are from that, and how you might see that starting to happen.

Maj. Gen. Alston: In this day and age there's so much material that is accessible, and if we were to have a knowledge wall and we should have a concentration of experience and a place where guys can shop for just good concentrated background on the work that they're doing, I don't know who could argue against that. At the same time, my wife is great at the internet, I can't stand it. So it's not about the internet, it's just to say that my need for information in this day and age, I as a guy as old as I am, I don't know how much allowing that to be there, or I should say integrating that into our daily lives, you'd have to do that at certain skill positions because there still have to be nurturer, some transmitter, some filter that would be the guy that could help the younger troops access that information and work through it.

On one end I absolutely want guys to just be theologically committed to their technical orders; but at the same time I need to enrich them on more of this why. So they need to be under the steady care of strong leaders and teachers and trainers. So there's a place for having this explosion of content that might be useful.

It brings up a larger point. We've been producing nuclear surety as if we had nine ICBM wings and 26 bomber wings. We produce it pretty much the same way. Is that the best way to produce nuke surety today? Given the different experience levels that we have. Or should we explore how to judge the way we produce nuke surety every day in our training and evaluation and our performance in the field and compliance with weapon system safety rules and technical data, and see whether or not in 2010 the force needs to leverage innovative ways to produce nuclear surety.

So this is a frontier that can be explored but I lack inspiration that I'm going to find a solution there. But I'm not rejecting the idea that more content managed carefully in the nuclear business, could have value. It may be exactly that kind of new step where you look at that and you go man, we could really leverage that kind of concentration and content right there. But right now it's not the place I'm going to bet the farm on. If you weren't [a client] I would bet the farm on that, but I need more education on that before I'd be a bit more excited about it.

Question: This is not a planted question, although it may appear that way. From your perspective, General Alston, having just left the A10 position and having been there as the road map was put together so we took care of triage and then it went into reinvigoration and then to strengthening, but form your perspective both as the former A10 and now as a numbered air force commander, what do you see that are the most necessary things that must be done in order for this effort to be sustained over a longer period of time? More specifically perhaps, beyond the period of time where our current Secretary and Chief are serving in their responsibilities. What is it you think has to happen at the Pentagon level on the one hand, for example, and then perhaps within the wings?

Maj. Gen. Alston: We are, as we look back over the last three years and beyond that, we recognize that there was probably a period of 17 years where there was elements of active or benign neglect of the nuclear enterprise. And great men and women in all of those nuclear disciplines, were doing great heavy lifting every day, and they were producing results every day. We were making trades on resourcing that didn't always benefit nuclear programs.

So now the focus that our Chief and Secretary have had since they both came on board in the summer of 2008, there is a lot of momentum and there is a lot of activity, and we are two years into a multi-year program to continue to climb to get us where we want to be.

I've talked about uneven experience, I've talked about human capital development. Clearly a message I'm communicating to you is that this is a work in progress. In some cases there is a lot of work yet to be cone. So to be sure, we should not have an expectation that guys who can grade our work, and I'm one of the guys that can grade our work, I think, there will be a lack of satisfaction that we have not achieved all that we need to achieve to be in the kind of steady state that we want to be in.

So there are personnel policies associated with that. There are resourcing priorities associated with that. On the Air Staff we created something called the Nuclear Deterrence Ops, a nuclear operations panel. That is part of the resourcing infrastructure inside the Air Staff. That is a useful forum for discussion of ideas. But it is not a place where nuclear becomes a hot knife through butter in order to get all the resourcing that you need.

So I think right now we're in a position where with Global Strike Command having a fully functioning MAJCOM that cares about

what we do, working hard every day, trying to support the mission in the field, that I think that as they have taken in both Air Force Space command and Air Combat Command's responsibilities, and as they start to begin their first couple of years resetting requirements and developing that kind of path forward across all of our capabilities, I think it's going to hinge on the effectiveness of the MAJCOM interfacing with the Air Staff in order for us to sustain the momentum.

So there are Air Staff elements that I would ice to believe that inside the programming aspects of our Air Force there would be enough nuclear identity that would be able to continue to have my Air Force compete well with nuclear. I think that's achievable if we deliberately better develop our nuclear leaders to assume those roles, key and influential roles in that community. But I think that the MAJCOM is going to have to be recognized as the clarion that has the refined, well thought out, detailed requirements and has the command presence to drive that and sustain that across the enterprise.

So I think that the concentration of effort and the success hinges as much on the success of Global Strike Command as it does on a receptive air staff to these requirements. I don't think there's a silver bullet. I think it's going to be hard work all the way through.

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